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This paper examines the effectiveness of allocating funds to the nation’s police 
departments for the prevention of domestic terrorism, as is done annually through the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Grants Program. The program, 
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Administration, has distributed 
billions of dollars since its 2003 inception in equipment, software, and technology 
services based on the recipient police agencies’ own risk assessments of local terrorism. 
Much of the technology desired by police consists of systems of mass surveillance; this 
thesis focuses on implementations of surveillance video cameras or CCTV, license plate 
readers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Drawing on academic studies, government 
watchdog reports, media coverage, police manuals, nonprofit publications, and 
sociological texts, research is guided by the hypotheses that mass surveillance is not 
suited for the prevention of terrorism and that grant recipients are requesting and 
implementing technology for purposes other than terrorism prevention. Using the 
Technology Policy Framework issued by the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
in 2014 to assess these implementations, findings include that an approach of surveillance 
policing is at odds with both the fundamental policy of policing as crime prevention and 
the principal tenet of maintaining citizens’ trust in the police. This thesis reveals a lack of 
empirical research on anti-terrorism measures and insufficient evidence that current 
surveillance methods prevent crime. Furthermore, due to the recognized low probability 
of terrorism, police departments are utilizing grant funds for investigative purposes as 





Within days of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., American 
lawmakers began to craft anti-terrorism legislation intended to address the conditions that 
enabled these attacks and to prevent future incidents of domestic terrorism. Six weeks 
later, the USA PATRIOT Act was unanimously agreed upon by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. When spelled out, the title of the USA PATRIOT Act, passed by Congress 
on October 26, 2001, reveals an emphasis not on the goal to reduce the risk of terrorism 
but on the chosen strategy to do so:  
 
Uniting and Strengthening America to Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. (Emphasis mine) 
 
Some of the tools chosen for inclusion in the Act consisted of legislation that 
dramatically expanded the powers of federal and local law enforcement and curtailed 
civil liberties and privacy protections (de la Peña, 2004). According to then-Senator Bob 
Barr (R-GA), the bulk of the document placed before the full Senate comprised 
legislation that had previously been rejected by Congress, such as the expansion of police 
powers and other items that were unrelated to domestic terrorism. For on the day of the 
full House and Senate vote, the version of the USA PATRIOT Act agreed by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee the evening before was replaced at 3:45am with one prepared in 
secret by Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Vice President, and the President (2004). 
When accused by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee of switching versions, 
Ashcroft responded, “To those who would scare peace-loving people with phantoms of 
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lost liberties, my message is this: Your tactics only aid the terrorists” (2004). In spite of 
not having read the proposed legislation before them, seemingly cowed by the threat of 
appearing pro-terrorist, the country’s elected representatives passed the Act the same day. 
Even before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush created, by 
executive order, the Office of Homeland Security on October 8, 2001, with former 
Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as its director (Congressional Research Service, 
2002). Not satisfied with that response, then-Senator Joe Lieberman (Ind-CT) introduced 
legislation just days later calling for the establishment of a federal department dedicated 
to homeland security. On July 16, 2002, the term “homeland security” entered the body 
politic through publication by the President’s Office of Homeland Security of The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, a 90-page document announcing the formation 
of a new federal department. The Department of Homeland Security was to facilitate 
information sharing among intelligence agencies and to fund local, regional, tribal, and 
federal domestic terrorism prevention efforts. National Strategy included the President’s 
definition of homeland security, a term heretofore unfamiliar to the public: 
 
Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (2002, p. 2) 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), launched in early 2003, was 
intended as the main tool to intercept and obstruct terrorism, specifically anti-American 
terrorism in the U.S. itself. Enacted by the Homeland Security Act in November 2002, 
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DHS was meant to remedy the situation that led to 9/11; for example, to “streamline 
information sharing” – widely believed to be a problem between FBI and CIA and 
pinpointed as a reason for the success of the 9/11 attacks (9/11 National Commission, 
2004). With the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, states the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, “Congress took important steps toward identifying and removing 
some barriers to the exchange of intelligence” (as cited in Congressional Research 
Service, 2002, page 48).  The USA PATRIOT Act had already provided broad legal 
support to the nation’s police departments and, according to prominent police experts 
such as William Bratton and George Kelling, local law enforcement was in the best place 
to detect terrorist activity (Newman & Clarke, 2008). This was later restated by Michael 
McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, and senior 
Committee member Bill Keating (D-MA): 
 
[S]tate and local police know their city’s streets and residents better than 
anyone. This knowledge makes them a force multiplier for federal law 
enforcement’s efforts. Their insight and impact are huge considering that 
nationwide there are just under 14,000 FBI agents, while in New York 
alone there are almost 35,000 NYPD officers. Clearly, utilizing local law 
enforcement expertise will ultimately result in keeping more Americans 
safe and mitigating the risk of terrorist attacks (2014). 
 
DHS quickly followed up its launch with financial support for the police by 
establishing the Homeland Security Grants Program, which has allotted billions in 
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equipment, software, training, and vendor services to branch offices in all 50 states and 
the U.S. territories since 2003 (DHS, 2017). In addition, the new department created a 
portfolio of grants for parties other than law enforcement, such as public transit agencies 
and nonprofit organizations. According to the Congressional Research Service, between 
2003 and 2011, DHS distributed over $40 billion in grants on homeland security (Reese, 
2012).  
Much of the funding received by police agencies from the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration – the DHS organization that administers the grants allocated 
for homeland security – goes toward the purchasing of general surveillance systems that 
observe the public and can capture various forms of personal data. By looking at 
implementations of three such technologies – surveillance video cameras, license plate 
readers, and unmanned aerial vehicles – this thesis seeks to challenge the effectiveness of 
DHS’s police grants based on two hypotheses: 1) general surveillance is a strategy not 
suited for the prevention of terrorism, and 2) police departments are using their grant 
allocations for purposes other than the detection of terrorists and terrorist activity.  
 
Methodology 
As a prism through which to view the research collected to examine my 
hypotheses, this paper leverages a policy framework created by representatives of the 
police themselves. In January 2014, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) published its first guide to formulating policy for the implementation and use of 
technological systems. The IACP’s “Policy Mandate” is clear and comprehensive and 
reflects an institution that serves the public: 
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Creating and enforcing agency policies that govern the deployment and 
use of technology, protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of 
individuals, as well as the privacy protections afforded to the data 
collected, stored, and used, is essential to ensure effective and 
sustainable implementation, and maintain community trust (2014, p. 2). 
 
“Just because a technology can be implemented does not mean that it should be.” 
This core tenet is part of the Technology Policy Framework by the IACP (p. 1). A 
nonprofit membership organization comprised of current and former police leaders, it 
was founded in 1893 to advance the “science and art of police services” by conducting 
research – often in collaboration with federal agencies and academic institutions – and 
issuing evidence-based policy guidelines for technical, administrative, and conduct-
related police practices (IACP.org, 2016). In light of the rapid evolution of technologies 
capable of recording and identifying personal data that have been made available to law 
enforcement, IACP recognized the need of providing a comprehensive technology policy 
framework as a resource to individual police departments. Using this framework, each 
would be able to create policies governing its use of technologies that would ensure these 
new tools deliver value toward policing goals while safeguarding the necessary trust and 
cooperation of the public (IACP, 2014).  
 The Framework identifies those technologies whose use is of particular concern 
to the public and most likely to be subject to legislative action, namely those that “have 
the potential to monitor, capture, store, transmit and/or share data, including audio, video, 
visual images, or other personally identifiable information which may include the time, 
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data, and geographic location where the data were captured” (p. 3). Examples include the 
three that form the focus of this thesis: surveillance video cameras, license plate readers, 
and unmanned aerial systems. All three constitute devices for general, or mass, 
surveillance; they are deployed by police in public locations – in stationary or mobile 
form – and are trained on the public without any individualized suspicion that may 
require a search warrant. At the same time, each captures visual, geographical, and 
chronological data points that can reflect personally identifiable information, even – 
given a sufficient amount collected over time – a history of destinations, habits, and 
affiliations.  
 Despite the capacity to develop knowledge of individuals and their behavior, this 
thesis argues that general surveillance modalities are unsuited as a prophylactic against 
terrorism. Foremost among President Bush’s three goals of homeland security is to 
prevent terrorism, and surveillance is inherently reactive – that is, its use is limited by the 
need to have already recorded an incident. In addition to limiting the type of technologies 
examined here, research for this paper focuses on implementations funded by DHS grants 
designated exclusively to local or regional law enforcement, which are the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the far less 
prevalent Operation Stonegarden – together, these make up the Homeland Security 
Grants Program.   
 Information on grant allocations, installations, and performance was drawn from a 
variety of sources to represent different perspectives and target audiences; these include 
academic journals, reports by government agencies such as the Government 
Accountability Office, articles from police news mailings such as the Federal Law 
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Enforcement Training Center’s TechBeat, publications from civil liberties nonprofits, 
research studies from institutions such as George Mason University’s Center for 
Evidence-Based Crime Policy and RAND Corporation, manuals from police 
organizations such as COPS, items from topical online portals such as Homeland 
Security Today, investigative journalism, and DHS.gov. These sources were monitored 
and studied over a period of over four years to examine the steps taken by police 
departments to identify the anti-terrorism equipment or systems to be covered by the 
Homeland Security Grants Program as well as the process of implementation and the 
outcome of these innovations. The analysis required to arrive at this paper’s conclusions 
and recommendations was based on the guidelines comprising the IACP’s framework; 
specifically, the “universal principles” that each police agency should adhere to when 
deciding to acquire new technology (see Table 1 in Appendix).  
These principles, or procedural steps, begin with the need to specify the objectives 
of the desired technology, which should align with the objectives of the agency, as well 
as what is required to implement and maintain it; for example, calculating total costs and 
identifying necessary staffing and skills training. Use and storage policies need to be 
documented and distributed regarding the data that is collected – be it video camera 
footage or license plate scans – including where and how long it will be kept, how it may 
be accessed and by whom; these rules should be shared with the public, providing 
transparent privacy policies.  
Framework principles further emphasize the importance of continually monitoring 
whether equipment and data collection are serving a purpose and achieving stated 
objectives, which requires defining in advance what metrics will be used to evaluate 
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performance. “Agencies should regularly monitor and evaluate the performance and 
value of technologies,” reads the document, “to determine whether continued deployment 
is warranted …” (p. 3). Police departments must implement adequate technical and 
infrastructural security against breach of data and identify what actions should be taken if 
in case of failure. Finally, the IACP demands that each department’s sworn or civilian 
personnel as well as possible contractors and volunteers are held accountable to its 
technology policies as well as the law, and that violations are officially sanctioned as 
determined in advance.   
How and whether these universal principles are applied as revealed in the 
literature sampled for this thesis addresses the hypotheses that surveillance technology is 
inherently unfit for the prevention of terrorist incidents, and that police agencies are 
relying on DHS grant allocations to fulfill objectives other than terrorism prevention.  
 
Risk- and performance-based grant allocation 
 As part of delivering on its mission of homeland security, DHS assigned to the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) the responsibility of 
distributing funding to local and state government agencies; these funds are available 
through FEMA’s Preparedness, or Non-Disaster, grants programs toward the National 
Preparedness Goal of a “secure and resilient Nation” (FEMA.org, 2017). There are eight 
such programs, ranging from the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program 
with a 2017 budget of $350 million to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, whose $10 
million budget has been allocated almost exclusively to Jewish advocacy organizations, 
to the Port Security Grant Program with a 2017 budget of $100 million targeted at the 
“highest-risk” ports in the U.S.  
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 Largest among the grants programs by far is the Homeland Security Grants 
Program (HSGP), whose 2017 allocations amounted to over one billion dollars, 
bolstering DHS policy of having local police constitute the “front line” in detecting 
homegrown terrorist threats against America (see Table 2). HSGP consists of three types 
of homeland security grant types exclusively available to law enforcement, targeted at 
state agencies, urban agencies, and border-area agencies, respectively: the State 
Homeland Security Program; the Urban Area Security Initiative; and the far smaller 
Operation Stonegarden, intended for police in states neighboring national borders to 
assist in DHS border security responsibilities.  
 
Table 2. Homeland Security Grants Program, FY 2011 – 2017 (in $ millions) 
Program 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
State Homeland 
Security Program 
526.8 294.0 354.6 401.3 402.0 402.0 402.0 
Urban Area Security 
Initiative 
662.6 490.4 558.7 587.0 587.0 580.0 580.0 
Operation Stonegarden 54.8 46.6 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 
TOTAL 1,244.2 831.0 968.3 1,043.3 1,044.0 1,037.0 1,037.0 
Source: DHS.gov, 2017 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 stipulated that federal funding was to be 
distributed according to the level of risk of a terrorist attack. However, according to 
repeated evaluations by the Government Accountability Office, DHS has struggled to 
determine standard risk assessment formulae and the responsibility of assessing risk fell 
to the police agencies themselves (2007; 2008; 2013). FEMA, a long-established federal 
institution, had no previous experience with issues of terrorism and relied on these self-
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assessments in approving grant requests. Additionally, legislation outlined that each state 
and territory receive a portion of the anti-terrorism funds regardless of risk. As a 
consequence, appropriations per state through the State Homeland Grant Program have 
not reflected even basic common sense; with Wyoming topping state anti-terrorist 
spending in 2011 at $9 per resident, for example, while New York was last at $4.70 per 
resident (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Top 10 DHS Grant Recipients, in dollars per capita 
1 Wyoming $9.00 
2 District of Columbia $8.60 
3 Vermont $8.20 
4 North Dakota $7.50 
5 Alaska $7.10 
6 South Dakota $6.20 
7 Delaware $5.70 
8 Montana $5.10 
9 Rhode Island $4.90 
10 New York $4.70 
Source: Stateline, 2011 (as cited in O’Sullivan, 2014). 
 
South Dakota received $100 million in the decade from the grants’ launch in 2003 
to 2013, making the state sixth in per-capita spending, despite being one of 15 states that 
U.S. intelligence agencies rated in 2010 as having "no specific foreign or domestic 
terrorism threat" (O’Sullivan, 2014). South Dakota has acquired equipment to detect 
11 
 
IEDs, surveillance camera systems for schools, and electronic fingerprinting technology 
based on the alleged threats of white supremacists and environmental terrorists targeting 
the Keystone XL pipeline (2014). In Texas, where the Department of Public Safety was 
designated in 2003 to administer the Homeland Security Grants Program, each of the 
more than 1,400 county, city, and tribal jurisdictions submit grant requests to FEMA 
every year (Stewart & Oliver, 2014).  
It was only three years into the FEMA grants program that DHS added the 
requirement for applying agencies to provide “investment justifications” that would be 
used to inform funding decisions (GAO, 2007). Also in Fiscal Year 2006, DHS made 
public its risk assessment method used to determine which cities would be eligible for 
Urban Areas Security Initiative grants; the number of recipients had grown from an initial 
seven to 43 in FY 2005. The new risk analysis would comprise components threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences (2007). However, the GAO found in 2008 that DHS 
assigned every state and urban area the same vulnerability score, as though they were 
equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack; this significantly undermined the credibility of the 
department’s risk assessments (GAO, 2008). A study conducted in 2007 of Texas police 
chiefs established that it was the receipt of homeland security funds that drove local 
agencies to implement anti-terrorism initiatives and not a perceived risk of terrorism; that 
in fact, only 42 percent of grant applicants had conducted a risk assessment of their locale 
(Stewart & Oliver, 2014).  
 In 2012, FEMA released a self-assessment toolkit for HSGP applicants called 
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to help police 
departments identify possible terrorist targets in their areas, opportunities for terrorism, 
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and the likelihood of attacks being staged. THIRA was not intended for use in FEMA’s 
evaluation of funding proposals (GAO, 2013). Instead, the mechanism was supposed to 
be matched with “national capability performance requirements and measures” for 
longitudinal success evaluations; these, however, had not been developed.  
Without assessing the risk of terrorism to an individual locale and without 
assessing the effectiveness of the technology requested to reduce that risk level, grants 
are awarded primarily based on the self-reported needs of police applicants. As a 
consequence, Dillingham, Alaska – a town of 2,400 – received a $202,000 grant for 
surveillance cameras, claiming that being a port city it was attractive to potential 
terrorists (Earle, 2006). In his 2012 report, Safety at Any Price, Senator Tom Coburn (R-
OK) examined the performance of FEMA’s largest individual homeland security grant 
program, UASI, and concluded that “With so few accountability measures in place, there 
is almost no way to ensure taxpayers are getting value for their money, and more 
importantly, whether they are safer” (p. 5). He noted that among the $7.1 billion spent 
through UASI grants to date, $98,000 had gone toward an underwater robot for 
Columbus, Ohio, to assist in rescue missions. Keene, NH, with a population of 23,000 
had not only been designated a high-risk urban area but had secured a UASI grant for a 
BearCat armored vehicle to protect the town’s annual pumpkin festival (Coburn, 2012). 
Referring to the Homeland Security Grants Program as a whole, DHS’s own 
Inspector General reported in 2012 that FEMA did “not have a system in place to 
determine the extent that Homeland Security Grant Program funds enhanced the states’ 
capabilities to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major 
disasters and other emergencies” (DHS OIG, 2012, p. 1).  
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FEMA’s lack of performance measures makes it unable to hold police 
departments accountable for their investments, or even to control whether the funds 
received are being spent on anti-terrorist technology. Regardless of the basis for receiving 
DHS funds, spending them is under the purview of the individual police departments. In 
the absence of procedures to evaluate police implementations to counter threats, police 
officials can choose to spend awards according to their own preferences and goals.  
Former New York police commissioner William Bratton has exhibited arguable 
disregard of the DHS mission of terrorism prevention. “One of the great benefits New 
York gets out of being the most likely terrorist target,” he boasted in 2014, “is that the 
funds that come in help us on the more prevalent issue of day-to-day crime” (Smith, 
2014). While this may align with the IACP Framework’s first universal principle of 
making technology use align with departmental objectives, it violates the intent and 
purpose of the federal homeland security grants.  
 
Prevention in policing 
Given the amount of grants available, the flexibility in their allocation, and the 
low likelihood of a terrorist attack in any domestic locale, it is no wonder that state and 
local police agencies are seeking to use new tools to meet longstanding objectives such as 
countering crime rather than terrorism. Some policing experts argue that – whether in 
preparation for an attack or merely for survival – potential terrorists are likely to commit 
“ordinary” crimes such as robbery and drug dealing, even that terrorism itself is just 
another type of crime (Newman & Clarke, 2008). Addressing police executives in 
particular, the Office of Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) emphasizes, 
however, that any changes made in their new role of policing terrorism “put a premium 
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on prevention, on service to the community” (2008, Brief 02) – requirements that uphold 
the oldest and founding principles in police work. 
  When post-industrialization London began to experience increasingly violent 
protests by factory workers and city residents perceived a rise in crime, recently 
appointed Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel was chosen to design the first modern police 
department (Johnson, 1981). At its launch in 1829, Peel issued to all officers a handbook 
that stated, “The object to be attained is the prevention of crime” (Reith, 1948, p. 62). He 
designated prevention policing a better method to keep citizens and property safe than 
would be the arrest of offenders after the fact. On foot patrol around the clock, police 
officers in the U.K. and – beginning in the 1840s – in the U.S. mingled physically with 
community members, gaining familiarity and trust with their constituents, and were thus 
able to preserve order and dissuade troublesome incidents (Johnson, 1981). “The test of 
police efficiency,” informs Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing, “is the absence of crime 
and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them” (Reith, 
1948).  
Key to prevention policing was the police uniform, whose deterrent function 
arguably makes it the first example of policing technology. The uniform also contributed 
to the accountability of individual officer as it identified him as a member of the police 
force to the public and forced him to behave professionally and in accordance with the 
law. Ironically, many police recruits initially protested against wearing the uniform, 
claiming it “smacked of subordination and tyranny” (Johnson, 1981, p. 28), not realizing 
how quickly it was to become a symbol instead of power and authority over regular 
15 
 
citizens. This has been especially true in the U.S., where police officers officially carry 
firearms, thereby exacerbating the power inequity with civilians. 
Peel’s paradigm of prevention policing is best represented by the 20th century’s 
community policing, which was heavily infringed by the surge in the 1990s of “broken 
windows” and “zero-tolerance” methods that relied largely on making arrests. The 
anathema of arrests to crime prevention is argued by researchers Cynthia Lum and Daniel 
Nagin of the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, who cite both financial and social 
costs (2015).  When interactions with the police began to generate overwhelmingly 
negative output – arrests and searches – the relationships with especially black and 
Hispanic neighborhoods soured, a phenomenon that Lum and Nagin seek to reverse in 
their blueprint (2015). Echoing the COPS and Peel directives to serve and earn respect 
from the public, they make inextricable the principles of crime prevention and “citizen 
reaction matters”; i.e., that regardless of the effectiveness of a given policing method, it 
must be reconciled with the community (2015). This is not merely to provide the positive 
quality-of-life outcome, as is associated with community policing (Kelling & Moore, 
1988), but also to ensure success of mutually agreed-upon crime prevention tactics. 
RAND policy analysts add another benefit to “seeking the input of ordinary citizens,” 
namely that this “confers local police with greater authority and legitimacy” (Treverton, 
Wollman, Wilke, et al, 2011, p. 25) – precisely what is needed to sustain cooperation. 
Crime prevention can take many forms, including environmental design, 
structural design, and target hardening – the defining characteristic is that it inhibits 
undesired action. Increased street lighting has been shown widely to reduce crime – both 
violent and property – as well as make people feel safer (Welsh & Farrington, 2008). 
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When plane hijackings started to take place in the 1970s, the installation of metal 
detectors was able to reduce their occurrence (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008); post-
9/11, airline manufacturers undertook widespread action to thicken cockpit doors to be 
resistant to attack. Crime prevention through environmental design (also known as 
CPTED) can be accomplished by simple changes to property through landscaping, adding 
fences, or removing thick hedges that serve to hide trespassing. Prickly vegetation 
underneath low-level windows can serve as a natural deterrence to would-be burglars 
(DesignOutCrime.com, 2011). These efforts can be undertaken by individual residents or 
by communities in collaboration with their local police departments as part of community 
policing, with its focus on prevention and transparency. The Los Angeles Police 
Department, for example, has an extensive CPTED initiative in place that was forged in 
partnership with consultancy Design Out Crime and can be explored on the department’s 
Web site (LAPD, 2016). 
After the 2001 terrorist attacks, however, over 80 percent of local law 
enforcement agencies responding to an IACP survey reported shifting their focus and 
efforts away from crime prevention in favor of counterterrorism (as cited in Kim & de 
Guzman, 2012).  
Anti-terrorism implementations 
[O]nly those technologies, and only those data, that are strictly needed to 
accomplish the specific objectives approved by the agency will be 
deployed, and only for so long as it demonstrates continuing value. (IACP, 




To justify the expense of the terrorism prevention system to be implemented, of 
training and human resources, and of maintenance, storage, and monitoring, as well as 
the potential shift in agency focus, the unknown latent consequences such as impact on 
community relations, the potential dependence on third-party manufacturers or 
contractors, and other eventualities, it would seem like commonsense to have evidentiary 
grounds to believe in the system’s success. Yet a comprehensive review of terrorism 
research revealed an almost complete lack of scientific study (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 
2008). A 2003 search across 17 literary databases and multiple disciplines returned 
14,000 articles containing references to terrorism, spanning a period from the early 1960s 
through 2002. Of the peer-reviewed articles, which one might assume would be likely 
based on empirical, if not quantitative, analysis, only three percent were.  
Over half of the 40 years of pieces were written in just two years, 2001 and 2002, 
clearly as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; still, 96 percent constituted “thought 
pieces,” offering no evidentiary basis for the terrorism prevention policies that were 
forged during these and the following years (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008). Most 
importantly, in the context of this thesis, none of the empirical or evaluation anti-
terrorism studies were conducted on the use of surveillance technologies, despite them 
having been available long before 2001. The only studies involving law enforcement 
were of airport security measures such as metal detectors; only 0.6 percent of peer-
reviewed articles concerned themselves with domestic terrorism (2008, Table 1, p. 37).  
These results appearing during precisely the time that DHS was created and its 
missions articulated, and the overall fear of another incident of domestic terrorism, do not 
indicate a timely shift in research toward identifying working prevention mechanisms. In 
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a 2007 survey of local law enforcement agencies, only 11 percent reported any 
interactions with the research community (Lum & Fachner, as cited in Lum, Haberfeld, 
Fachner, & Lieberman, 2011). This strongly indicates that the choices by police and 
sheriff departments of surveillance video cameras, license plate readers, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles as preventive tools against domestic terrorism have been based largely on 
factors other than proven effectiveness. Referred to as “general surveillance” because 
they monitor the public at large based only on geographic location, these technologies 
generate records that must first be interpreted by humans before any intervention can take 
place; general surveillance is inherently a reactive mechanism, which makes it of 
questionable use for the prevention of crime or terrorism.  
 
Surveillance video cameras or CCTV (closed-circuit television) 
CCTV advocates have successfully marketed limited evidence of success 
in very specific areas (parking lots) as an effective crime prevention 
strategy for both violence and property crime prevention in ALL public 
places. (Haggerty, as cited in Byrne & Marx, 2011, p. 22)  
 
Surveillance cameras are deployed for generally three purposes: to deter criminal 
activity, to investigate crimes and identify suspects, and to instill a feeling of safety 
among citizens. When visible, the cameras intend to deter individuals from engaging in 
unwelcome activity by presenting the possibility of getting caught; second, to apprehend 
suspects identified on tape, which can serve as evidence in court; and finally, to reassure 
residents they can move safely, without threats posed by unmonitored individuals.  
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CCTV is best known for decades of permeating Britain as a response to wide-spread 
bomb attacks by Northern Ireland’s IRA. British police reported that although the 
cameras had been implemented with deterrence in mind, reality had shown them to be 
purely investigatory. “There's no fear of CCTV,” stated Detective Chief Inspector Mick 
Neville at London’s Metropolitan Police. “Why don't people fear it? [They think] the 
cameras are not working” (Bowcott, 2008).   
This is not an unreasonable assumption. A 2004 $45 million UASI grant went to 
Chicago’s Cook County to launch “Project Shield,” which was to outfit two police 
vehicles in each of the 128 suburbs with surveillance cameras feeding live video to a data 
analysis command center; in addition, the suburbs themselves were to have mounted 
cameras in place (Marin & Moseley, 2012).  Three years after the project went into 
implementation, reports emerged of fraud and mismanagement by contractor IBM. In 
2012, an investigation found that cameras were not being maintained, many had not been 
tested before implementation and had never worked, and police had selected locations for 
the mounted cameras of “questionable homeland security benefits” – namely, facing 
police parking lots and inside precinct lobbies. Project Shield was scrapped as a total 
failure, leading then-Representative Mike Quigley to address the Government 
Accountability Office: “We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars across the country 
on homeland security. If Project Shield is any indication, we are less safe” (Marin & 
Moseley, 2012).   
As a method to deter violent crime, surveillance cameras have shown little 
success. In repeated studies with convicted armed robbers and thieves, participants were 
asked to rank a list of crime prevention methods in order of deterrence.  All placed 
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surveillance cameras near or at the bottom; police patrol figured among the top deterrents 
(Schlosberg & Ozer, 2007). Participants said they were not afraid of cameras because 
they “knew” nobody was watching. Video footage witnesses activity; it has not been 
shown to be useful as a deterrent. A 2002 study of 22 implementations of CCTV in both 
Britain and the U.S. concluded that “while cameras could have a marked effect on 
reducing vehicle crime, there was little evidence they prevented violent crime” (BBC, 
2002). In fact, follow-up reports found that street lighting was more effective in 
preventing violent crime and property crime (2002). Yet in 2009 London alone had one 
million cameras installed, according to an internal police report, and even when used for 
investigative purposes, CCTV could claim but one crime solved annually per 1,000 
cameras (BBC, 2009).  
In spite of dubious success abroad and very little research on implementations in 
the U.S., local police departments continue to request systems that are almost certainly 
not going to detect terrorist activity and are dramatically invasive. The Boston 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, having saturated its subway system, successfully 
applied for a DHS grant for $6.7 million to equip its buses with surveillance cameras, 
which now record two-thirds of Boston’s bus trips (Powers, 2014).  
 The remote and reactive properties inherent to CCTV arguably present a hazard to 
public safety in that the installations of such systems allow local law enforcement to rely 
on them to replace the need for human patrol. NYPD chief Bratton might want to 
reevaluate New York’s anti-terrorist preparedness in light of what took place on July 22, 
2014.  In the early hours of the morning, a group of artists walked onto the Brooklyn 
Bridge, replaced the U.S. flags with white ones, and left the scene without being detected 
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or apprehended (Schneider, 2014). They were able to carry out this stunt despite the 2011 
installment of 1,800 surveillance cameras in Manhattan, at the cost of nearly $200 million 
to DHS (Kappstatter, 2011). In its failure to avert what could have been a successful 
terrorist attack, New York City’s surveillance system demonstrated the ineffectiveness of 
surveillance video for that purpose. In its first eight months, the Ring of Steel, as dubbed 
by then-police commissioner Ray Kelly, had enabled the arrest of 100 suspects of crimes 
such as assault and purse-snatching, according to the NYPD. Kelly pointed out the Ring’s 
accomplishments of detecting “bags left on the sidewalk,” which he claimed could be 
indicators of terrorism, and said the city would soon double the amount of cameras 
(2011).  
Based on the examples discussed in this section it is apparent that surveillance 
camera installations in the U.S. have not had a measurable impact on preventing 
terrorism. CCTV is a surveillance technology that has limited, post-facto applications, 
mainly in investigative policing. 
 
License plate readers 
From 2006 through 2011, DHS awarded over $50 million in grants to local police 
departments for purchasing license plate readers (LPRs); recipients included Los 
Angeles; a Georgia county of 23,000; and municipalities of varying sizes in between 
(Angwin & Valentino-Devries, 2012). LPR technology falls under “general surveillance” 
because, like video cameras, it surveys the public indiscriminately. However, while 
camera networks continuously videotape without predefined data points, license plate 
readers are manufactured to grab individual “scans” of all license plates within its range, 
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along with the time and location of each capture, and can run these through a database to 
identify matches. License plate readers have traditionally been “portable,” meaning they 
are installed onto a law enforcement vehicle. Police purchasers have the option of 
“mobile” readers – units that can be moved among vehicles. Location information is 
recorded using GPS in the case of LPRs affixed to these vehicles; for stationary or 
mounted LPRs, it is recorded according to reader location; e.g., in the form of a particular 
street intersection.  
In a 2004 study, the Ohio State Highway Patrol – in partnership with LPR 
manufacturer Remington-Elsag – mounted LPRs at Ohio Turnpike toll booths to scan the 
license plate of each vehicle driving onto the Ohio turnpike (OSHP, 2005). OSHP had a 
“hot list” of 345,000 license plate numbers tied to stolen automobiles or wanted felons, 
most of which had been provided by the National Crime Information Center, with 8,000 
being Ohio license plates. By the end of the four-month research period, the LPRs affixed 
to the three toll booths had stored almost 1.9 million scans; according to toll booth 
operators, this amount meant that the devices had failed to scan 14 percent of total 
turnpike entries during this period. Moreover, not all scans were of license plates; some 
were of strings of numbers from elsewhere on a vehicle. Altogether, the scans generated 
3,286 alarms, of which only 108 were considered “positive” in that both state and license 
plate number matched state and license plate number of the entry on the hot list (see Figure 
1).  Ultimately, only 17 scans triggered valid alarms, meaning that they led to an arrest; this 
translates to one valid alarm in 194 alarms registered by the LPR system. Despite 
automation, it is clear that the use of LPRs requires significant police work in comparing 
scans to hot list entries for verification. Meanwhile, the deterrence effect of police 




Figure 1. Alarms per LPR scans 
 
 
Because LPR scans can recognize specific identifiable information, if monitored 
in real time, officers can apply the data immediately to pursue the vehicle identified. 
Whether this technology is more effective than patrol officers working off a hot list has 
been tested. The Police Executive Research Foundation and the Mesa, Arizona, police 
department collaborated on a 48-week study to compare the results of LPR technology 
with those of manual license plate checks (Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2010). Although 
LPRs resulted in more immediate arrests and locating stolen cars, the areas monitored by 
police patrol showed a long-term decrease in thefts, suggesting that the visibility of police 
officers busily checking plates worked as a deterrent (Vergano, 2011). Consequently, it 
would seem that the immediate recognizable benefit LPRs provide to conventional local 
law enforcement is retrieval of stolen automobiles, which is unlikely to be of use in the 
detection of terrorists.  
 IACP project manager Meghann Tracey confirms that the primary driver for 
police to purchase LPR systems is to retrieve stolen cars (2010). Officers are also 
attracted to LPRs because they allegedly allow for efficiency in traffic stops to capture 
lapsed registrations, revoked licenses, and persons with outstanding arrests: “The quantity 
of stops has gone down,” claims one state trooper, “because the quality of stops has gone 
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up” (2010). However, Tracey says, the technology’s real strength lies in assisting 
investigations through the storage of license plate scans over time, allowing police to 
reconstruct the before and after movements of a person under suspicion of a crime that 
has already occurred.  
If there is an argument for LPRs as crime prevention method, it remains elusive. 
By gathering license plate scans and storing them for analysis, police departments across 
the country are feeding information to regional data centers for intelligence agencies to 
possibly spot a pattern indicating terrorist intent. Police departments have come to view 
surveillance not as a tool to prevent or intervene in unlawful activity, but as a reactive 
mechanism to record all activity for undetermined and indeterminate use. The use of 
LPRs for building databases of license plate scans presents an enhanced ability to spy on 
individuals; the police department in Milpitas, California, with a population of 67,000, 
has stored 4.7 million license plate scans, meaning that residents are recorded over and 
over, providing an itinerary of their lives (Angwin & Valentino-Devries, 2012).          
 
Unmanned aerial vehicles  
Known more popularly as “drones,” unmanned aerial vehicles have long been used by the 
military for surveillance and dropping bombs the world over. In the late 2000s, 
manufacturers such as AeroVironment, the U.S. military’s largest supplier of unmanned 
aerial vehicles, began to eye the domestic market and identified local law enforcement as 
a potentially lucrative customer base (Gunderson, 2012). Unlike the Predator, made by 
defense contractor General Atomics, AeroVironment’s UAVs are primarily “MAVs” – 
micro aerial vehicles such as the Qube, Wasp, and Raven. MAVs have wingspans of only 
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a few feet, weigh between one and four pounds, and are small enough to fit in a backpack 
or car trunk. While they are not weaponized, they are outfitted for surveillance with zoom 
lenses, infrared or thermal imaging cameras, and the capabilities to house radar and video 
analytics such as facial recognition (Stanley & Crump, 2011). These devices – other 
manufacturers include Honeywell and Draganfly Innovations – require far more hands-on 
operation, staff, and training than most sheriffs and police chiefs realize, and they are 
bound to specific flying rules. Departments seeking a cheaper and more nimble tool than 
a helicopter must consider that a UAV of this type – which costs between $40,000 and 
$200,000 – may fly at a maximum altitude of 400 feet and requires a trained pilot to 
operate the vehicle. Operators must follow the FAA’s “line-of-sight” provision: the UAV 
must always remain in sight of its pilot (2011). Moreover, UAVs are prohibited in 
airspace over populated areas, airports, or harbors. MAVs are also limited to smooth 
sailing – they cannot withstand windy weather and many cannot fly at night or during 
low clouds. Flight time capabilities range from 10 to 110 minutes (2011; Gunderson, 
2012; Thompson, 2012).  
 The first and to date primary use of UAVs in the U.S. has been by federal 
agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for surveillance – or 
situational awareness – along the U.S. border with Mexico. Police departments 
themselves most commonly first cite purposes of assisting in finding missing persons and 
monitoring traffic accidents. When Medina County, Ohio, was cleared to deploy a 2.2-
pound drone in early 2013, the county sheriff Tom Miller offered the following 
justification: “About two or three times a year, we have maybe kids or seniors with 
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Alzheimer’s who have walked away”  (Nethers, 2013). Drones granted to Arlington, 
Texas; counties in northern Virginia; and elsewhere have all been funded with DHS anti-
terrorist grants to police departments who did not articulate an anti-terrorist need. Instead, 
police officials tend to cite the protection of community members – even as they request 
technology that has to date only been used against people. For example, the deputy 
sheriff of Montgomery County, Texas, used a $300,000 DHS grant to purchase a 
Shadowhawk drone, made by military supplier Vanguard Defense Industries (Langford, 
2011). He, too, cited the location of missing persons as an objective, as well as directing 
firefighters during forest fires. The Shadowhawk is weaponized for use in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and, while Deputy Sheriff Randy McDaniel insisted the county’s version 
would not be, Vanguard can provide law enforcement the use of tear gas canisters, flares, 
smoke, and beanbag projectiles (2011).  
Without the adherence to the simple IACP principle that requested technology 
comply with state law and regulations, many police departments eager to use UASI 
grants for UAVs may be unable to use them. In 2011, an unmanned aerial vehicle was 
purchased by Honolulu contractor responsible for port security to patrol the city’s harbor 
without seeking permission from the Federal Aviation Administration (Dooley, 2012). 
The $75,000 drone had to be relegated to storage due to FAA guidelines that forbade 
UAVs from entering harbor airspace. In 2014, the San Jose, California, police department 
purchased a UAV with a $7,000 UASI grant, knowing full well it would not be able to 
use it because the department had yet to fill out an application with the FAA. The San 
Jose PD does already know how it will utilize its homeland security purchase: to help 
Bay Area bomb squads conduct threat assessments and to “inspect state parks and 
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wilderness areas for illegal vegetation” (Farivar, 2014). For its part, Arlington, Texas, 
received permission from the FAA to fly its two drones from Leptron Industrial 
Helicopters that it purchased with a UASI grant (Govers III, 2013). Home to the Dallas 
Cowboys, the Arlington police department requested the grant to provide security during 
potential Superbowls; however, it is against FAA rules to fly UAVs above crowds for 
safety reasons (Thompson, 2012). More everyday missions for the Leptron Avengers 
would be to locate missing persons and to take crime scene photos – neither having any 
preventive underpinning (Govers III, 2013). 
 
Policing the public  
If [citizens’] trust is violated and public approval lost, police are not able 
to effectively perform their duties to keep communities safe.   
(IACP, 2014, p. 2)  
 
In the years after the 2001 terrorist attacks, police departments saw their funding 
from COPS eclipsed by funding from DHS; in 2008, according to the Office of 
Management and Budget, overall federal spending on counterterrorism led federal 
spending on crime prevention by 15 billion (as cited in Stewart & Oliver, 2014). A 
tendency to deemphasize public partnership as a paradigm was perhaps to be predicted. 
Post-9/11, policing mentality and tactics seem to have morphed from community policing 
to policing the community. Criminal justice researchers Kim and de Guzman believe the 
so-called “war on terror” awakened a paramilitary mindset among officers and paved the 
way for a shift to homeland security policing (2012, p. 323) – the current policing era. 
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Like previous major shifts in police strategy, this shift correlates with, and may be largely 
due to, new technology. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Grants Program spawned 
the implementation of general surveillance in every region of the country, regardless of 
risk, and usually without the transparency and approval of the public that research and the 
IACP Framework so emphatically recommend. Many urban ethnic and religious 
communities experienced additional invasive policing methods such as infiltration and 
street searches, which broke trusting relations established between community leaders 
such as imams and law enforcement (de la Peña, 2004). Considering also the bruised 
relationship between minority populations and the police sustained through previous 
policing methods, officers have arguably lost significant public trust in 21st century 
America, and thereby a crucial partner in preventing crime. A recent Gallup poll write-up 
titled “Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average” reported that 57 percent of 
Americans have confidence in the police (Norman, 2017). However, this headline and 
percentage reflects a growth only among older white Conservatives and Republicans. 
Confidence among blacks is at 30 percent and among Hispanics 45 percent; moreover, 
the past two years have seen drops among Liberals, Democrats, and 18- to 34-year-olds 
with confidence percentages of 39, 44, and 44, respectively (2017). This thesis does not 
mean to attribute these confidence level changes to surveillance technology usage but to 
point out that the trust considered vital to police functions, such as detection of terrorist 
activity in the community, is lacking. 
The technological advancements introduced over the 20th century may have 
planted the seed for the remote and reactive policing favored today. The rise of telephone 
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dispatch encouraged motorized patrol, for example; instead of the community beat cop 
being on-site to deter crime, police car patrol became a mechanism of waiting to respond 
to crime (Byrne & Marx, 2011). Even at rest, automobiles introduced a physical barrier to 
the individual citizen and the lack of everyday interaction enabled a change in perception 
among officers and civilians from “us and them” to “us versus them.” The introduction of 
general surveillance deepens the divide; civilians en masse have become police targets 
through the lens of assorted cameras permeating their neighborhoods and business 
districts. Police surveillance underlines the appearance that officers view the community 
primarily as a body of potential wrongdoers.  
Surveillance technology manufacturers and law enforcement are quick to remind 
citizens they do not have a right to privacy in public. License plate readers record what is 
exposed on public streets. People cannot expect to be protected from video surveillance if 
visible to passers-by. However, the Fourth Amendment adds to a person’s expectation of 
privacy that it be reasonable. Justice Harlan first articulated a “constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy” in Katz v. United States (1967). Justice Harlan’s two‐
fold test is “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.” People videotaped through open windows by police in a publicly parked car 
cannot reasonably expect privacy. If they retire to their bedroom, which faces the 
backyard, and see a five-pound, camera-equipped police quadcopter hovering at their 
open window, they may not be legally entitled to privacy, but it is hard to imagine that 
anyone would consider this reasonable. 
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Police chiefs have now had years of experience witnessing the pitfalls of 
deploying new police technology outside of a formal process such as the one proscribed 
by the IACP Framework (2014). Not involving the public in purchasing decisions and 
roll-out requirements, for example, and not making plain what purposes a given device 
might have, has in places caused anger and distrust among affected citizens toward local 
law officers. One week after the Seattle Police Department abandoned its plan to fly two 
unmanned aerial vehicles purchased with HSGP funds due to public outcry (Thompson, 
2012; Clarridge, 2013), Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn invited the public to comment upon 
the purchase of 30 surveillance video cameras through a $5 million DHS grant 
(Clarridge, 2013b). The cameras had already been designated to shore up security along 
the city’s waterfront and had already been installed; however, the mayor insisted on 
delaying their activation until Seattle residents could weigh in.  
A better example of police-community collaboration is Oakland’s 2014 creation 
of a Privacy Commission, an advisory body to guide City Council decisions on 
surveillance technologies proposed by law enforcement (Hofer, 2016). After participating 
in the decision to purchase such a system, Commission members work together with the 
Oakland Police Department in formulating transparency and privacy policies governing 
its implementation (2016). 
 
Summary of main findings 
The research conducted for this thesis illuminated that general surveillance does 
not function as a reliable deterrent of especially violent crime; surveillance cameras have 
in select studies shown small results in thwarting property theft, particularly of 
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automobiles. Instead, police implementations are using their new technology to add to 
their toolbox for the investigation of crime and locating already-identified suspects. 
According to a multi-site study on police implementations of technology in 2015,  
 
The effectiveness of technology is most often measured in the same way 
police effectiveness more generally is measured, by the ability to identify 
people to solve cases and make arrests. (Koper, Lum, Willis, et al, 2015, p. 
144) 
 
Police officers are also feeding the terabytes of data generated across the nation’s 
LPR and CCTV systems as well as footage from the occasional UAV mission to the data 
centers established by DHS and manned by intelligence analysts seeking clues to terrorist 
activity. This does not make these technologies preventive of terrorism; rather, it makes 
local law enforcement into information providers for federal prevention efforts. 
We have also witnessed how police agencies are responding to the availability of 
the Homeland Security Grants Program by applying because it is there and not out of 
perceived risk of terrorism to their locale. Because of lacking oversight and performance 
measures from FEMA, local police have had trouble neither in securing grants without 
showing cause nor in translating their funding into the gadgets they desire. These other 
objectives may align with policing principles but do not align with the mandate of DHS. 
With these results, it seems clear that instruments of public surveillance are not effective 
in achieving homeland security, even while in isolated cases they can serve as a deterrent 
to select crimes. It would seem that police are aware of the large gap between probability 
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of terrorism and the need for preventive measures and are taking advantage of DHS’s 
police grants to serve other purposes.  
 
Conclusion 
Even though the terrorists’ success in attacking the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon that fateful Tuesday was widely blamed on the lack of cooperation between 
FBI and CIA (9/11 Commission, 2004) and even though it was an FBI field agent who 
wrote the Phoenix Memo to headquarters that warned of the strange behavior of Saudi 
Arabian flight school students in Minnesota (2004), Congress decided through the USA 
PATRIOT Act that, in the “war against terror,” it was the role of local police officers that 
needed to be enhanced. 
When lawmakers identified local police officers as best positioned to discover 
homeland threats, they argued it was because police officers are in touch with the people 
who live in the homeland. Street cops are physically present to witness human interaction 
and everyday routines. It is ironic, therefore, that the awards issued to local police 
departments have only served to create distance; sitting in cars, precincts, and fusion 
centers watching screens makes officers just as remote as the legislators in Washington.  
What local law enforcement agencies in cities, towns, even rural regions are paying ever-
closer attention to is the data output of general surveillance devices – the reams of 
footage of innocuous activities and interactions of everyday citizens. Lacking real-time 
monitoring, the purpose of this output is to feed local DHS data centers, which does not 
benefit the communities being recorded. Stored data cannot deter crime or intervene 
where dangerous situations emerge, as a beat cop might. Remote and reactive technology 
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cannot serve as a “force multiplier” or replacement for human street patrol when the goal 
is prevention. The function of deterrence in crime-fighting is neglected – it does not serve 
the purpose of collecting personally identifiable data. If the goal is enhancing data 
profiles, preventive strategies are beside the point.  
 The finding that homeland security grants are obtained largely without believing 
in a local risk of terrorism ought to be discouraging for DHS and a reason to formulate 
better processes of evaluating grant proposals and risk assessments. It would also make 
sense to recognize that police are not terrorism experts – hardly anyone is, and given the 
lack of terrorism science, there is no basis for having law enforcement officials conduct 
their own risk assessments. Further, there is no basis for law enforcement to choose 
surveillance mechanisms for prevention; should surveillance be valuable for other 
policing purposes, that argument must be made through evaluation research, cost-benefit 
analyses, and consider Lum and Nagin’s “citizen reaction matters” factor.  Grounded in 
the IACP principles that demand the police act on behalf of the citizenry is the 
recommendation to return to an era of police officers enjoying the popularity of foot 
patrol (Kelling & Moore, 1988) and the deterrent effect of the uniform (Johnson, 1981) 
and getting to know their constituents. As Peel pointed out, police cannot execute their 
functions without “public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour” (Reith, 
1948), and much of the public, particularly minority populations, lacks the requisite faith 
in today’s policing. 
Good policies governing the use of technology are anchored in public service and 
democratic principles, as proscribed by Peel (1829), COPS (2008), Lum & Nagin (2015), 
and the IACP (2014) to name but a few of those focusing on outcomes rather than output. 
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Innovation – whether in technology or policy – should advance goals of the people, not 
alienate them. “The core values that define us as a country are what make us strong as a 
nation,” says ACLU Chairman Anthony Romero (de la Peña, 2004). “They’re not a 
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Table 1. IACP Technology Policy Framework: Universal Principles 
1 Specification of use 
Agencies should define the purpose, objectives, 
and requirements for implementing specific 
technologies, and identify the types of data 
captured, stored, generated, or otherwise 
produced. 
2 Policies and Procedures 
Agencies should articulate in writing, educate 
personnel regarding, and enforce agency 
policies and procedures governing adoption, 
deployment, use, and access to the technology 
and the data it provides. These policies and 
procedures should be reviewed and updated on 
a regular basis, and whenever the technology or 
its use, or use of the data it provides 
significantly changes. 
3 Privacy and Data Quality 
The agency should assess the privacy risks and 
recognize the privacy interests of all persons, 
articulate privacy protections in agency 
policies, and regularly review and evaluate 
technology deployment, access, use, data 
sharing, and privacy policies to ensure data 
quality (i.e., accurate, timely, and complete 
information) and compliance with local, state, 
and federal laws, constitutional mandates, 
policies, and practice. 
4 
Data Minimization and 
Limitation 
The agency should recognize that only those 
technologies, and only those data, that are 
strictly needed to accomplish the specific 
objectives approved by the agency will be 
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deployed, and only for so long as it 
demonstrates continuing value and alignment 
with applicable constitutional, legislative, 
regulatory, judicial, and policy mandates. 
5 Performance Evaluation 
Agencies should regularly monitor and evaluate 
the performance and value of technologies to 
determine whether continued deployment and 
use is warranted on operational, tactical, and 
technical grounds. 
6 Transparency and Notice 
Agencies should employ open and public 
communication and decision‐making regarding 
the adoption, deployment, use, and access to 
technology, the data it provides, and the 
policies governing its use. When and where 
appropriate, the decision‐making process 
should also involve governing/oversight bodies, 
particularly in the procurement process. 
Agencies should provide notice, when 
applicable, regarding the deployment and use of 
technologies, as well as make their privacy 
policies available to the public. There are 
practical and legal exceptions to this principle 
for technologies that are practical and legal 
exceptions to this principle for technologies that 
are lawfully deployed in undercover 
investigations and legitimate, approved covert 
operations. 
7 Security 
Agencies should develop and implement 
technical, operational, and policy tools and 
resources to establish and ensure appropriate 
security of the technology (including networks 
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and infrastructure) and the data it provides to 
safeguard against risks of loss, unauthorized 
access or use, destruction, modification, or 
unintended or inappropriate disclosure. This 
principle includes meeting state and federal 
security mandates (e.g., the FBI’s CJIS Security 
Policy), and having procedures in place to 
respond if a data breach, loss, compromise, or 
unauthorized disclosure occurs, including 
whether, how, and when affected persons will 
be notified, and remedial and corrective actions 
to be taken. 
8 
Data Retention, Access, and 
Use 
Agencies should have a policy that clearly 
articulates that data collection, retention, 
access, and use practices are aligned with their 
strategic and tactical objectives, and that data 
are retained in conformance with local, state, 
and/or federal statute/law or retention policies, 
and only as long as it has a demonstrable, 
practical value. 
9 Auditing and Accountability 
Agencies and their sworn and civilian 
employees, contractors, subcontractors, and 
volunteers should be held accountable for 
complying with agency, state, and federal 
policies surrounding the deployment and use of 
the technology and the data it provides. All 
access to data derived and/or generated from 
the use of relevant technologies should be 
subject to specific authorization and strictly and 
regularly audited to ensure policy compliance 
and data integrity. Sanctions for non‐
46 
 
compliance should be defined and enforced. 
Source: IACP, 2014 
 
